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Abstract The Argument Web is maturing as both a platform built upon a synthe-
sis of many contemporary theories of argumentation in philosophy and also as an
ecosystem in which various applications and application components are contributed
by different research groups around the world. It already hosts the largest publicly
accessible corpora of argumentation and has the largest number of interoperable and
cross compatible tools for the analysis, navigation and evaluation of arguments across
a broad range of domains, languages and activity types. Such interoperability is key
in allowing innovative combinations of tool and data reuse that can further catalyse
the development of the field of computational argumentation. The aim of this paper
is to summarise the key foundations, the recent advances and the goals of the Argu-
ment Web, with a particular focus on demonstrating the relevance to, and roots in,
philosophical argumentation theory.
Keywords Argumentation · Argument mining · Debate technology · Dialogue
games · Mixed initiative argumentation
1 Introduction
The growth in computational models of argument over the past two decades has been
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research. Fragmentation in the area, however, has consistently threatened to under-
mine its maturity with reduced incremental development and a litany of wheel
re-inventions. This is the problem that has been tackled by the Argument Web: to
provide an environment or ‘ecosystem’ in which data sharing and re-use, incremental
development of software, and theory and application interoperability are the quotid-
ian modus operandi of research in the field. This paper aims to do two things: first, to
provide an overview of the Argument Web and its various foundations, applications,
tools and datasets for an audience that is more familiar with philosophical ground;
and second, to show how theories of argumentation developed in philosophy, com-
munication, linguistics and social psychology have influenced and been taken up in
both the core engineering that has brought the Argument Web into being, and also in
its various applications and software systems that are starting to drive usage.
The approach in the paper is necessarily broad and shallow. We begin in Section 2
with central concepts of argument representation, first for common argument con-
cepts, then extensions particularly for dialogue (this separation reflects discussions
in the philosophical literature stretching back to the early 1980s on the relationship
between argument products and argument processes). The extended Section 2 thus
represents the underpinning upon which the remainder of the paper depends. The
first port of call for the application of these argument representations is in the philo-
sophically very familiar task of argument analysis, in Section 3. The introduction of
analytical techniques, however, is divided by the rather engineering-oriented distinc-
tion between individual and collaborative analysis. For philosophy, and particularly
critical thinking and informal logic, the most prominent use of argument analysis
techniques is in pedagogy and pedagogical application of the Argument Web; these
are reviewed in Section 4. Driven in part by the social epistemological movement,
many areas of philosophy are increasingly being influenced by a empiricist perspec-
tive and argumentation is no exception. Section 5 looks at the ways in which the
Argument Web can support such research through tools for curation and management
of linguistic resources. With so much data available, navigation and evaluation of
argument becomes increasingly challenging, and these areas are briefly reviewed in
Sections 6 and 7, respectively. An extraordinarily hot topic in computational models
of argument is currently the challenge of argument mining—automatically extract-
ing argument structures from natural text; some of the approaches and successes are
reviewed briefly in Section 8 and then finally in Section 9 an example from the philos-
ophy of science (and specifically of mathematics) is summarised to show how many
of these pieces can be brought together to achieve significant theoretical advances.
Across this breadth, the paper aims to equip the reader with both theoretical and
practical understanding of the Argument Web.
2 Argument Representation
The interdisciplinary overlap between philosophical and computational approaches
to argumentation has been a major growth area within Artificial Intelligence over
the past three decades. AI has long been an idiosyncratic hybrid of pure theory and
pragmatic engineering, and nowhere is this more true than in computational models
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of argument. The mathematical theories of argument which originate in works such
as that by Dung (1995) have been enormously influential in theoretical models of
reasoning in AI, because they provide the machinery for handling issues such as
defeasibility and inconsistency in ways that traditional classical logics are not able to
support. These same mathematical theories are, however, barely recognisable as theo-
ries of argumentation as the philosophical and communication scholarly communities
would know them—they serve rather as ‘calculi of opposition’.1
At the same time, AI is also home to applications of theories of informal logic
(Gordon et al. 2007), of pedagogic critical thinking (Reed and Rowe 2004), of
rhetoric (Crosswhite et al. 2003) and of legal argumentation (Walton 2005): these
applications are all rooted squarely in the tradition of argumentation theory as a dis-
cipline, and diverge from it in ways that are typically incremental and driven by
pragmatic necessity.
Whilst the fecundity of the research area has been clear (Rahwan and Simari
2009), the diversity and sheer number of different systems has led, inevitably, to frag-
mentation. It was this problem that led in 2005 to a workshop to explore possible
means of harmonisation between approaches and systems. The remit of the meeting
was avowedly practical: to try to find ways that these systems might start to work
together. But practical, engineering issues turn very quickly to deep and open philo-
sophical issues: What constitutes an enthymeme, a fallacy or an inference? What
differentiates presumptions and assumptions in argument? How can linguistic and
psychological conceptions of argument be reconciled? Are propositions the right
atoms from which to construct argumentation complexes? What is the character of
the rules that govern argument dialogues? And so on.
Clearly, it is impractical to hope that these questions might be resolved once
and for all, so the approach is to start by focusing, quite pragmatically, upon what
is currently the best understanding of the various issues. Walton’s work figures
large here (Walton 1984, 1996; Walton and Krabbe 1995). But the work has also
tapped into pragma-dialectics, into speech act theory, and into the work of theo-
rists such as Brockriede (1974), Freeman (1991), Groarke (1999), Hitchcock (2002),
Kienpointner (1992), Krabbe (2003), O’Keefe (1977) and Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969)2 amongst many others.
At the first iteration, the goal is to lay some solid foundations with a focus
specifically upon representing arguments. Whilst there are many AI systems that rea-
son with arguments, present arguments, render arguments in natural language, try
to understand natural arguments, visualize arguments, navigate arguments, critique
arguments, support the construction of arguments, mediate arguments, and so on, we
cannot hope to begin by solving problems special to each. It seems reasonable to
assume, however, that all of these systems might want to store arguments in some
1The phrase ‘calculus of opposition’ is due to Henry Prakken: he suggested it in a private discussion, but it
strikes us as a particularly apt description not only of what is supported by Dung’s concept of acceptability,
but also very much the spirit behind it.
2These citations are indicative: there are both many more works by these authors and many other authors
that have had an impact on computational developments.
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structured format. This, then, is the focus. If we want to set out to try to support har-
monisation between systems, and to do so in a way that is as closely tied as possible
to current models from the theory of argumentation, then we start with a simple task
that is common across most AI systems of argument: representation.
2.1 The Argument Interchange Format
The Argument Interchange Format (AIF) (Chesn˜evar et al. 2006) was developed to
provide a flexible—yet semantically rich—way of representing argumentation struc-
tures. The AIF was put together to try to harmonise the strong formal tradition
initiated to a large degree by Dung (1995), the natural language research described
at CMNA workshops since 2001,3 and the multi-agent argumentation work that has
emerged from the philosophy of Walton and Krabbe (1995), amongst others.
The AIF can be seen as a representation scheme constructed in three layers. At
the most abstract layer, the AIF provides a hierarchy of concepts which can be used
to describe argument structure. This hierarchy describes an argument by conceiving
of it as a network of connected nodes that are of two types: information nodes that
capture data (such as datum and claim nodes in a Toulmin analysis, or premises and
conclusions in a box-and-arrow analysis in the style of Freeman (1991), for example),
and scheme nodes that describe passage between information nodes (similar to the
application of warrants or rules of inference). Scheme nodes in turn come in several
different guises, including scheme nodes that correspond to support or inference (or
‘rule application nodes’), scheme nodes that correspond to conflict or refutation (or
‘conflict application nodes’) and scheme nodes that correspond to value judgements
or preference orderings (or ‘preference application nodes’). At this topmost layer,
there are various constraints on how components interact: information nodes, for
example, can only be connected to other information nodes via scheme nodes of one
sort or another. Scheme nodes, on the other hand, can be connected to other scheme
nodes directly (in cases, for example, of arguments that have inferential components
as conclusions, e.g. in patterns such as Kienpointner’s (1992) ‘warrant-establishing
arguments’). Inference captured by multiple incoming scheme nodes thus naturally
corresponds to convergent argumentation; that covered by multiple premises sup-
porting a single incoming scheme node corresponds to linked argumentation (Walton
2006). The AIF also provides, in the extensions developed for the Argument Web
(Rahwan et al. 2007), the concept of a ‘Form’ (as distinct from the ‘Content’ of
information and scheme nodes). Forms allow the AIF to represent uninstantiated def-
initions of schemes (this has practical advantages in allowing different schemes to
be represented explicitly—such as the very rich taxonomies of Walton et al. (2009),
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Grennan (1997), etc.—and is also important
in law, where arguing about inference patterns can become important).
A second, intermediate layer provides a set of specific argumentation
schemes (and value hierarchies, and conflict patterns). Thus, the uppermost layer in
3http://www.cmna.info
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the AIF ontology lays out that presumptive argumentation schemes are types of rule
application nodes, but it is the intermediate layer that cashes those presumptive argu-
mentation schemes out into Argument from Consequences, Argument from Cause to
Effect and so on. At this layer, the form of specific argumentation schemes is defined:
each will have a conclusion description (such as ‘A may plausibly be taken to be
true’) and one or more premise descriptions (such as ‘E is an expert in domain D’).
Walton’s schemes (Walton 1996; Walton et al. 2009) have been developed in full for
the AIF (Rahwan et al. 2007).
It is also at this layer that, as Rahwan et al. (2007) have shown, the AIF supports
a sophisticated representation of schemes and their critical questions. In addition
to descriptions of premises and conclusions, each presumptive inference scheme
also specifies descriptions of its presumptions and exceptions. Presumptions are
represented explicitly as information nodes, but, as some schemes have premise
descriptions that entail certain presumptions, the scheme definitions also support
entailment relations between premises and presumptions. The AIF has here largely
followed the lead of a collaboration between Walton and two AI researchers, Gordon
and Prakken (Gordon et al. 2007).
Finally, the third and most concrete level supports the integration of actual frag-
ments of argument, with individual argument components (such as strings of text)
instantiating elements of the layer above. At this third layer, an instance of a given
scheme is represented as a rule application node (with the terminology of rule
application—RA—and conflict scheme application—CA—and so on now easier to
interpret). This rule application node is said to fulfill one of the presumptive argumen-
tation scheme descriptors at the level above. As a result of this fulfillment relation,
premises of the rule application node fulfill the premise descriptors, the conclusion
fulfils the conclusion descriptor, presumptions can fulfill presumption descriptors,
and conflicts can be instantiated via instances of conflict schemes that fulfill the
conflict scheme descriptors at the level above. Again, all the constraints at the inter-
mediate layer are inherited, and new constraints are introduced by virtue of the
structure of the argument at hand.
The AIF standard is available in a number of different ‘reifications’—that is, in a
number of different computer languages, from detailed and extensive data expressed
in a language compatible with the Semantic Web (viz., RDF and OWL), through
versions in languages familiar to programmers in commercial and scholarly domains
such as JSON and Prolog, as well as compact languages and formats aimed, for
example, at visualisation (such as DOT and SVG).
In addition, various threads of research have demonstrated equivalences (often
with some limiting or simplifying assumptions) with major other computational
approaches to argumentation such as the high profile Carneades tool which has
a jurisprudential foundation and offers rich evaluative mechanisms (Gordon et al.
2007); the popular analysis tool Rationale (van Gelder 2007); one of the most mature
approaches to formal representation of ‘structured’ (in contrast to ‘abstract’ argumen-
tation) in ASPIC+ (Bex et al. 2013); and a specific form of abstract argumentation
that grounds arguments in observations, Evidence-based Argumentation Frameworks
or EAFs (Oren et al. 2010).
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2.2 Extensions to Handle Dialogue
The next step is to allow the representation of dialogue. Several preliminary steps
in this direction have been taken (Reed 2006; Modgil and McGinnis 2008; Reed
et al. 2008), building on work in computational systems on protocol specifica-
tion (see, e.g. the work of the FIPA group4) and in philosophy on dialogical
games (such as Mackenzie 1990). The motivation for this work can be summarised
through O’Keefe’s distinction between argument1 and argument2: argument1 is an
arrangement of claims into a monological structure, whilst argument2 is a dialogue
between participants—as O’Keefe (1977)[p122] puts it, ‘The distinction here is evi-
denced in everyday talk by ... the difference between the sentences ‘I was arguing1
that P’ and ‘we were arguing2 about Q.’ ’ There are self-evident links between
argument1 and argument2 in that the steps and moves in the latter are constrained
by the dynamic, distributed and inter-connected availability of the former, and fur-
ther in that valid or acceptable instances of the former can come about through sets of
the latter. An understanding of these intricate links which result from protocols and
argument-based knowledge demands a representation that handles both argument1
and argument2 coherently. It is this that the dialogic extensions to the AIF set out to
provide.
The fundamental building blocks of dialogues are the individual locutions. In the
context of the AIF, Modgil and McGinnis (2008) have proposed modelling locutions
as information nodes. We follow this approach primarily because statements about
locution events are propositions that could be used in arguments. So for example, the
proposition, Bob says, ‘ISSA will be in Amsterdam’ could be referring to something
that happened in a dialogue (and later we shall see how we might therefore wish to
reason about the proposition, ISSA will be in Amsterdam) – but it might also play a
role in another, monologic argument (say, an argument from expert opinion, or just
an argument about Bob’s communicative abilities).
Associating locutions exactly with information nodes, however, is insufficient.
There are several features that are unique to locutions, and that do not make sense
for propositional information in general. Foremost amongst these features is that
locutions often have propositional content. The relationship between a locution and
the proposition it employs is, as Searle (1969) argues, constant – i.e. “proposi-
tional content” is a property of (some) locutions. Whilst there are other, non-locution
propositions that may also relate to further propositions, (e.g. the proposition, It
might be the case that it will rain) the relationship of propositional content is cer-
tainly not ubiquitous (It is Tuesday does not have propositional content—it simply
is a proposition). On these grounds, we should allow representation of locutions to
have propositional content, but not demand it for information nodes in general –
and therefore the representation of locutions should form a subclass of information
nodes in general. We call this subclass “locution nodes”. There are further reasons
4Available online at http://www.fipa.org/repository/aclspecs.html.
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for distinguishing locution nodes as a special case of information nodes, such as the
identification of which dialogue(s) a locution is part of. (There are also some fea-
tures which one might expect to be unique to locutions, but on reflection are features
of information nodes in general. Consider, for example, a time index—we may wish
to note that Bob said, ISSA will be in Amsterdam at 10am exactly on the 1st March
2010. Such specification, however, is common to all propositions. Strictly speaking,
It might be the case that it will rain is only a proposition if we spell out where and
when it holds. In other words, a time index could be a property of information nodes
in general, though it might be rarely used for information nodes and often used in
locution nodes).
Given that locutions are (a subclass of) information nodes, they can, like other
information nodes, only be connected through scheme nodes. There is a direct anal-
ogy between the way in which two information nodes are inferentially related when
linked by a rule application, and the way in which two locution nodes are related
when one responds to another by the rules of a dialogue. Imagine, for example, a dia-
logue in which Bob says, ISSA will be in Amsterdam and Simon responds by asking,
Why is that so?. In trying to understand what has happened, one could ask, ‘Why did
Simon ask his question?’ Now although there may be many motivational or inten-
tional aspects to an answer to this question, there is at least one answer we could
give purely as a result of the dialogue protocol, namely, ‘Because Bob had made a
statement’. That is to say, there is plausibly an inferential relationship between the
proposition, Bob says ISSA will be in Amsterdam and the proposition, Simon asks why
it is that ISSA will be in Amsterdam. That inferential relationship is similar to a con-
ventional inferential relationship, as captured by a rule application. Clearly, though,
the grounds of such inference lie not in a scheme definition, but in the protocol defi-
nition. Specifically, the inference between two locutions is governed by a transition,
so a given inference is a specific application of a transition. Hence, we call such
nodes “transition application nodes” and define them as a subclass of rule application
nodes. (Transition applications bear strong resemblance to applications of schemes
of reasoning based on causal relations: this resemblance is yet to be further explored,
but further emphasises the connection between inference and transition).
So, in just the same way that a rule application fulfils a rule of inference scheme
form, and the premises of that rule application fulfil the premise descriptions of the
scheme form, so too, a transition application fulfils a transitional inference scheme
form, and the locutions connected by that transition application fulfil the locution
descriptions of the scheme form. The result is that all of the machinery for connect-
ing the normative, prescriptive definitions in schemes with the actual, descriptive
material of a monologic argument is re-used to connect the normative, prescriptive
definitions of protocols with the actual, descriptive material of a dialogic argument.
With these introductions, the upper level of this extended AIF is almost complete.
For both information (I-) nodes and rule application (RA-) nodes, we need to dis-
tinguish between the old AIF class and the new subclass which contains all the old
I-nodes and RA-nodes excluding locution (L-) nodes and transition application (TA-)
nodes (respectively). As the various strands and implementations of AIF continue,
we will want to continue talking about I-nodes and RA-nodes and in almost all cases,
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it is the superclass that will be intended. We therefore keep the original names for the
superclasses (I-node and RA-node), and introduce the new subclasses I′ and RA′ for
the sets I-nodes\L-nodes and RA-nodes\TA-nodes respectively.
One final interesting question is how, exactly, L-nodes are connected to I-nodes.
So for example, what is the relationship between a proposition p and the proposi-
tion ‘X asserted p’? According to the original specification of the AIF, direct I-node
to I-node links are prohibited (and with good reason: to do so would introduce the
necessity for edge typing—obviating this requirement is one of the advantages of
the AIF approach). The answer to this question is already available in the work of
Searle (1969) and later with Vanderveken (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). The link
between a locution (or, more precisely, a proposition that reports a locution) and the
proposition (or propositions) to which the locution refers is one of illocution. The illo-
cutionary force of an utterance can be of a number of types (Searle and Vanderveken
(1985) explore this typology and its logical basis in some detail) and can involve var-
ious presumptions and exceptions of its own. In this way, it bears more than a passing
resemblance to scheme structure. These schemes are not capturing the passage of a
specific inferential force, but rather the passage of a specific illocutionary force. As
a result, we refer to these schemes as illocutionary schemes or Y schemes. Specific
applications of these schemes are then, following the now familiar pattern, illocu-
tionary applications or YA nodes. Illocutionary schemes are referred to with gerunds
(asserting, promising, etc.), whilst transitional inference schemes are referred to with
nouns (response, statement, etc.), which both ensures clarity in nomenclature, and is
also true to the original spirit and many of the examples in both the Speech Act and
Dialogue Theory literatures.
2.3 Further Extensions
As a common interlingua for representing argumentation, the AIF thus captures a
simple core of argument-related notions. Whether working in philosophy, linguis-
tics or computer science, it is inevitable that specific research projects, teams or
schools will need to go beyond this lowest common denominator. For that reason,
the AIF infrastructure has been designed to support not only a core vocabulary (or
“ontology”), but also a principled mechanism by which it can be extended with addi-
tional, supplementary representation systems (or “adjunct ontologies”, AOs). AOs
are designed according to a general guiding principle that they should encapsulate
the AIF core. One of the most mature AOs available for the Argument Web is the
social layer, a set of components for maintaining information about arguers and users
of argumentation software (Snaith et al. 2013). Applications that make use of the
social layer (such as Argublogging (Snaith et al. 2012)) access the social layer only;
the social layer encapsulates all of the information available in the AIF. In this way,
AIF resources can continue to be shared between all Argument Web systems, whilst
the specific needs of individual sets of applications with specific requirements can be
catered for appropriately. (Of course, in many cases, including that of the social layer
AO, there are also multiple applications which can share these extended data sets –
OVA and Arvina, discussed later, both make use of the social layer, for example).
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Fig. 1 Three instances of positive consequences reasoning (from aifdb.org/argview/2307)
2.4 Examples of the AIF in Action
To show how the AIF handles familiar types of argumentative structures and
exchanges, we include here three examples: a Walton argumentation scheme; a
Pollock-style undercutter and a dialogical exchange. In Fig. 1, the claim women
need free access to abortion forms the conclusion of four convergent arguments.
Three correspond to instances of the argumentation scheme for Argument from Pos-
itive Consequences, plus a further argument not assigned any specific scheme in this
analysis. For each instance, it is possible to reconstruct the implicit components asso-
ciated with the scheme, such as, e.g. achieving full political, social and economic
equality with men is desirable. In this way, the implicit premises of an argument can
be identified by matching up explicitly mentioned structure with characteristic struc-
ture in the general scheme definition. The template provided by the scheme points
the way to the implicit premises. Such reconstruction has been demonstrated to be
a particularly tricky task (Hitchcock 2002), so this template-driven enthymeme res-
olution is theoretically valuable. Schemes also embody critical questions which, as
explored by Verheij and Arguments (2005) and then extended in the AIF by Rah-
wan et al. (2007), play several roles, indicating not just implicit components, but also
stereotypical patterns of attack. Such patterns of attack are of several kinds and one
of the most important distinctions is that between rebutting and undercutting attack.
Whilst conflict between claims can straightforwardly capture rebutting attack, the
structure of undercutting attack is a little more complex. The notion of undercutting
was introduced by Pollock (1995) so we use his example to explain the AIF approach
to undercutting.
In Fig. 2, the conclusion that the object appears red is not itself attacked, but
rather the inference (from the premise that it appears red to the claim that it is red)
is attacked. Thus, the conflict (the Conflict Application, or CA) targets the inference
(the Rule of inference Application, or RA). As both Verheij and Arguments (2005)
and Rahwan et al. (2007) explore, some critical questions associated with schemes
are associated with rebutting structures, some with undercutting structures.
Finally, the AIF has also been extended to handle argument that is situated in
dialogical situations (Reed et al. 2008). A key insight in that work takes issue with, for
example, the pragma-dialectical claim that illocutionary acts of arguing are located
at the point of premise-giving (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992), which relies
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Fig. 2 Undercutting in the AIF (from aifdb.org/argview/4)
upon interpreting premise-giving as a complex speech act. By reifying the rules that
govern dialogical progression, and then permitting those rules themselves to create
or ‘anchor’ illocutionary force, arguing can be interpreted as an illocutionary act
that comes about as the result of a relation between uttering a premise and uttering
a conclusion, thus mirroring the logical structure of inference in its illocutionary
structure. This theoretical approach that underpins the dialogical extensions to AIF
is known as Inference Anchoring Theory (Budzynska and Reed 2011).
Figure 3 shows how this works: dialogical activity is shown on the right hand side,
connected by applications of rules of dialogue (Transitions, or TAs) such as that a
challenge can be responded to by a substantiating assertion. Simple locutions can
anchor illocutionary forces—Why?, for example, anchors challenging (the proposi-
tional content of which is the same as the preceding assertion). But TAs can also
anchor illocutionary force: the connection between the challenge and its response is
the locus of arguing (in this case, the illocutionary force of arguing has as its content
an instance of the argumentation scheme for Argument from Analogy).
Fig. 3 Dialogue in the AIF (from the OVA+ view accesible from aifdb.org/argview/10939)
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3 Argument Analysis
3.1 Individual Analysis
With techniques for representing argument, perhaps the first place to start is how
to exploit that representation language and create argument data—this is the task of
argument analysis. There is a long history of argument analysis software which has
in turn spawned a number of review and comparison articles including the work of
Harrell (2005), Scheuer et al. (2010) and Kirschner et al. (2003) which review dif-
ferent application areas (including deliberation, eDemocracy and eRulemaking, the
law, and so on) and different philosophical starting points (Toulmin, Freeman, Wal-
ton and more). The emergence of the AIF was itself a result of this tradition, with the
markup language used by Araucaria (Reed and Rowe 2004) used as a base, enhanced
with features from Carneades (Gordon and Walton 2006), DeLP (Garcı´a and Simari
2014) and others, reflecting not ony practical improvements but also improvements
reflecting deeper theoretical insights (including the ability to handle undercutting
arguments, full graph structures, etc.).
Between 2001 and 2010, Araucaria was a widely used analysis tool, with over
10,000 users in 80 countries. Though implementing a rather primitive conception
of argument, it was the first tool to cater for multiple analytical styles or theo-
ries of argument—not only a common ‘box and arrow’ analysis characterised in
the most detail by Freeman (1991), but also a view based on Toulmin’s account
of argument (Toulmin 1958) and in addition a further view embodying a rich dia-
grammatic vocabulary developed by the legal theorist Wigmore (1931). Crucially,
despite the differences in the visual conventions, the underlying data structures and
the XML-based language for storing them was unified with theory-specific exten-
sions where theoretical elements were not mappable to concepts in other approaches.
This established the concept of ‘theory neutrality’ (Reed and Rowe 2005) which
remains a cornerstone of the Argument Web. That is, there are sufficient features of
argumentation common to most or all theories and conceptions to form a common
interlingua.
A number of systems built upon the success of Araucaria, including language
specific developments such as an open-source branch of the code base in Mandarin,
and a programme of published research in Polish (Budzynska 2011).
More significantly, however, most of the functionality of Araucaria was re-
implemented for online, in-browser use in the OVA (Online Visualisation of Argu-
ment) tool.5 Though diagramming in Toulmin and Wigmore styles is not available
(for these, Araucaria is the only option), OVA supports a range of analytical goals.
3.2 Collaborative Analysis
Most software tools designed to support argument analysis focus on a single user.
Software such as Google Docs, however, has demonstrated the strong appetite for
5OVA is available at ova.arg-tech.org
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Fig. 4 The AnalysisWall
tools that support collaborative working; with OVA running online, it was extended
in version 2.0 to provide a Google-style link to allow multiple analysts to work
together on a single analysis (Janier et al. 2014). A number of other online tools (such
as DebateGraph, debategraph.org and RationaleOnline, rationaleonline.com) support
multiple concurrent users, but few support collaborative argument analysis.
Some types of analysis demand large-scale collaborative analysis. For work-
ing with live broadcast debate, the AnalysisWall (Fig. 4) provides a large, shared
workspace—a very high resolution 7.7 sqm touchscreen running bespoke argument
analysis software supporting effectively unlimited concurrent touch points (i.e. with
no restrictions other than physical space on the number of analysts that can work
to gether).6 The analysis that is supported is similar to that offered by OVA: con-
necting nodes through inferences and conflicts, optionally specifying argumentation
schemes, distinguishing undercutting from rebutting and marking reported speech. In
addition, the very size of the AnalysisWall (at over 3m long) means that it is impor-
tant to support grouping of nodes so that an analyst standing to the lefthand side
can share some work by flicking an analysed group across to an analyst working
on the right. The AnalysisWall supports collaborative analysis streamlined to work
in real-time and has been used to conduct analysis of the BBC Radio 4 programme
The Moral Maze. Coupled with a stenographer who could provide a live text stream,
6The hardware for this was developed on a shoestring, with six budget projectors providing imaging
onto a hand-built Frustrated Total Internal Reflection touch surface with feedback detected by modified
Playstation cameras. More information about the build is available at arg.tech/analysiswall
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plus two analysts working on a separate terminal to segment the text into argumenta-
tive components which were then delivered automatically to the Wall, the hardware
enabled teams of between six and ten analysts to work together, just managing to
keep pace with the incoming flow of argumentation from the radio programme. The
team would split and internally restructure briefly and fluidly, forming ad hoc groups
of two or three to work on a part of the reasoning before returning to the overall anal-
ysis. This analysis resulted in large AIF datasets all of which are then manipulable
by the other tools desribed in this paper. Results from this analysis can be found at,
for example, aifdb.org/argview/789.
4 Argument Pedagogy
One of the largest domains and strongest drivers for work on software for argument
analysis has been pedagogy (though pedagogical applications often go beyond just
analysis). In many areas of the world, the teaching of critical thinking forms a key
part of a broad introductory foundation to university level education, and in almost
all parts of the world, definitions of university ‘graduateness’ refer to skills normally
considered a part of critical thinking or informal logic.
The various tools for analysis described in the previous Section have all been
deployed in educational settings. In particular, OVA is widely used currently with
around 5000 unique users per year from over 50 countries.
One of the attractions of deploying Argument Web tools in the classroom is that
there are also software applications for providing automatic assessment and feedback.
Previously, the only way of making use of automated mechanisms for grading and
assessment was to use multiple-choice examinations (Fisher and Scriven 1997). Such
tests are not ideal and cannot be used across the board, however, because they assess
only a narrow range of skills, offering only very limited scope for assessing students’
depth of understanding. Many software systems have focused instead on allowing
students to conduct detailed box-and-arrow style analyses (for a review and detailed
comparison see, e.g., Scheuer et al. 2010)—the problem is that such analyses have
had to be marked by hand.
Argument Web infrastucture, however, allows such student analyses to be easily
manipulated by other software components. By running graph matching algorithms
over student analyses prepared in OVA, it is possible to compare submissions against
one or more model answers, converting results not only into a grade (via a tutor-
configured scoring algorithm) but also template-driven textual feedback. This is
the functionality offered by the Argugrader system7 which has been trialled both
at the University of Dundee and at City University of New York. An example of
the feedback offered by Argugrader is shown in Fig. 5 showing component-by-
component marking of a student generated analysis, plus template-driven feedback
and overall scoring. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only extant system that
automatically performs grading on the basis of argument structure.
7See www.argugrader.com
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Fig. 5 Feedback from the Argugrader system
5 Argument Curation
Alongside an increasing engagement with empiricism in philosophy, the use of data
has started to play a more significant role in argumentation theory (see, for example,
Goodwin’s panel on empirical and corpus research in argumentation at the Interna-
tional Pragmatics Conference in 2007). As a result, the Argument Web has a variety
of features to facilitate the collection, curation, sharing, tracking, comparison and
summary of datasets.
AraucariaDB (Reed 2005) was the first publicly available corpus of analysed
argumentation in the world, but was rather limited in size (around 700 arguments)
and analysis rubric (with no measurement of inter-annotator agreement). Though
AraucariaDB was imported into the Argument Web infrastructure, it now forms just
one corpus amongst many.
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At the beginning of 2017, the servers hosted by the Centre for Argument Tech-
nology for providing aifdb.org8 stored 11,000 arguments involving 60,000 claims
expressed in around 1.2m words. The infrastructure supports many different scripts
(and has been tested with Mandarin, Korean, Hindi, Arabic, Hebrew and Cyril-
lic), and the databases store analyses of arguments that have been contributed in 14
different languages.9
As the size of the dataset increases, organisation is required. Sharing of argument
analyses is crucial to support the growth of the community because such analysis is
so labour intensive. However, research teams need to have confidence in the perma-
nent availability of resources, of their immutability, that they can be cited, aggregated
and reused. This is the challenge of data curation for the Argument Web, and it is to
tackle this challenge that AIFdb was extended to support definition of corpora. These
extensions are available online at corpora.aifdb.org. Many of the data available in
AIFdb are now organised into specific corpora, where individual corpora have been
developed for particular research projects or in particular research groups. Again at
the start of 2017, there are over 70 corpora developed by nine different labs in Europe
and North America, covering fields of argumentation as diverse as mediation, ped-
agogy, politics, broadcast debate, eDemocracy and financial discussion. In addition,
two other corpora both of which became available in 2014: viz. the Potsdam Micro-
text Corpus (Peldszus and Stede 2015) and the Internet Argument Corpus (Walker
et al. 2012) have been migrated to the Argument Web infrastructure. In order to meet
the needs of the community, corpora can be freely defined to package up sets of
analyses (or indeed sets of subcorpora) from AIFdb. Corpora may be locked by their
creators so that they are immutable—though other users could create similar corpora
with newer contents of course. At time of writing, the tools for managing Argument Web
corpora are undergoing a process which will allow corpora to be allocated Digital
Object Identifiers (DOIs) allowing them to be formally citeable in their own right.
As a common research task, the statistical analysis of corpora is supported through
a suite of analytics (at analytics.arg.tech, Fig. 6) that offer insight into the size and
structure of corpora, and allow comparison between them (for measurements such as
the κ estimate for inter-annotator agreement (Fleiss 1971)).
6 Argument Navigation
With many thousands of argument resources available on the Argument Web infras-
tructure, and the rate of addition continuing to increase, there is an increasingly acute
need for tools to help navigate and interrogate the data. There are three broad types
of navigation: static, dynamic and dialogical.
Static navigation of argument resources comprises straightforward visualisation
techniques of graph structures and ‘point-and-click’ navigation traversing from one
claim in an argument network to another. Though good quality interface design
8AIF databases can be hosted locally and federated.
9Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Russian,
Spanish and Ukrainian
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Fig. 6 Analytics for the Argument Web
makes this a convenient mechanism for dealing with small argument networks (of
up to around 100 component parts—premises, conclusions, etc.), it rapidly becomes
unmanageable and confusing as the datasets become greater. An average analysis of
a 45-minute episode of the BBC Radio 4 debate programme, The Moral Maze, for
example, comprises around 500 components; viewing a programme in its entirety
renders text illegible and interconnections little more than spaghetti (see, for example,
aifdb.org/argview/789).
For those arguments naturally associated with a temporal flow, an obvious means
of navigation is using the time axis to scroll back and forward through the discourse.
Inspired by the graphically extraordinary work of Pluss and De Liddo (2015), tools
for temporal playback are now being released for dialogical AIF resources.
Finally, an observation offered by Freeman (1991) has laid a foundation for a fur-
ther type of navigation. Freeman suggests that the relationships between components
in a (perhaps entirely monological) argument can be probed by considering what
questions might have been asked to yield the relationships. Thus, a convergent argu-
ment structure is associated with a fictitious respondent asking, ‘Can you give me
another reason?’ whilst a linked structure is associated with the question, ‘Why is
that relevant?’ Though Freeman’s goal was to shed light upon the tricky structural
distinction, his method can be operationalised in software as a navigation tool. That
is, we can treat dialogue as a means of navigating the information space defined by
argument structures. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that there is a single set of
dialogue moves or dialogue rules by which we might navigate any argument. Dif-
ferent contexts, different domains, different fields may demand different types of
dialogue. So for example if we are navigating legal arguments, perhaps navigation
is best achieved in part through questions concerning the burden of proof; for argu-
ments being navigated in pedagogical settings, perhaps questions that elicit partial
answers or that require more specificity for the student are most appropriate. Such
The Argument Web 153
dialogical navigation can thus be translated by software into varying sets of instan-
tiated moves from which users can select at any point and sets of less constrainted
moves that allow new information to be elicited from users.
As a result, the Argument Web provides a language for describing the rules of
these dialogue games or dialogue protocols (essentially, this is a specialised computer
programming language)—the Dialogue Game Description Language, DGDL (Wells
and Reed 2012). Many well known philosophical investigations from Ramus to the
present day have made use of formal dialectical games; Wells and Reed (2012) show
how many of these games (Hamblin’s H, Mackenzie’s DC, Walton’s CB, Walton &
Krabbe’s PPD and others) can be captured as DGDL specifications.
With many different dialectical games available in a library of DGDL specifi-
cations, a general purpose dialogue execution engine is required to run them. This
is provided by the Dialogue Game Execution Platform, DGEP, which provides a
simple environment that software engineers can use to build applications that sup-
port human-human or human-machine dialogue. There are several such applications
available, the two most stable of which are Arvina and Argublogging.
Arvina allows multiple humans to engage in a structured dialogue simultaneously
with mutiple software agents. (Arvina and DGEP make no distintion between human
players and artificial players; they simply keep a track of who can say what when—
this ‘level playing field’ between humans and software in dialogue is known as mixed
initiative argumentation). The software agents are responsible for arguments already
available on the Argument Web and associated with a specific individual who orig-
inally put them forward. In this way, software agents can advocate on behalf of the
original proponents. Conversely, human participants can use the dialogue game to
explore the arguments of previous, human participants (or arguments that have been
analysed using tools such as OVA). Figure 7 shows Arvina in use.
Fig. 7 Dialogue on the Argument Web with Arvina
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Another dialogue application on the Argument Web is designed specifically for
bloggers, enabling arguments to be co-constructed between bloggers and between
blogs. The system is described in more detail in the work of Snaith et al. (2012), but
what is salient here is the way in which dialogue games do not just prescribe how
information is navigable, but also, at the same time, how it is to be extended. To
extend Freeman’s questions, above, if a dialogue game allows a user to express their
opinion and for some other agent to ask for a reason and why that reason is relevant,
then as an inevitable side effect, the Argument Web is updated not just with the user’s
opinion, but with the opinion structured as a linked argument. Argublogging embod-
ies an extremely simple dialogue game, but nevertheless provides an interface that
is intuitive for bloggers whilst at the same time intercepts their contributions so that
the structured arguments on their blogs are available through AIF on the Argument
Web. Such user-generated content holds great potential as a way of gathering large
amounts of structured data for further scholarly research.
7 Argument Evaluation
Both computational and philosophical exploration of argument place great emphasis
on the ability to evaluate arguments. In philosophy, such evaluation is founded upon
standards of proof, or levels of audience acceptability, or persuasiveness or rational-
ity, or by reference to a set of normative standards. In computational work, evaluation
has been largely focused on analytical definitions of acceptability. This notion is
akin to consistency, although, via the work of Dung (1995) on abstract argumen-
tation acceptability, acceptability semantics is significantly more robust in the face
of sub-deductive reasoning (such as inductive, presumptive and defeasible patterns)
common in natural argumentation.
The Argument Web offers a variety of evaluation engines. Because of the strong
focus in AI on evaluation over argument structures, this is an area of the Argument
Web that is leading the way in terms of functioning as an ecosystem in which different
research labs contribute different parts of solvers that combine to become available
in general purpose form. Dung-O-Matic (Snaith et al. 2010) was an early implementation
of a variety of acceptability semantics (including grounded, preferred, ideal, eager,
and semi-stable) that works only on abstract frameworks. TOAST (Snaith and Reed
2012) works with structured data (i.e. raw AIF structures), converting them to abstract
frameworks according to Bex et al. (2013) and then calling Dung-O-Matic. Tweety
(Thimm 2014) is an implementation of DeLP (Garcı´a and Simari 2014) that uses
a simple mapping from AIF into a logic program. Finally ArgSemSAT (Cerutti et al.
2014) uses a computational technique known as SAT solving to compute acceptability
over abstract frameworks using the same translation as is performed in TOAST.
8 Argument Mining
If the Argument Web is to expand its reach and increase its data resources by sev-
eral orders of magnitude, techniques for manual analysis and for intercepting user
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generated content will not be enough. It will be necessary to turn to automated tech-
niques for identifying both the presence and the structure of argument in unrestricted
natural text. This is the challenge of argument mining.
Just a few years ago, the prospect of automatically extracting the structure of
reasoning from natural language text was firmly beyond the state of the art: only
very preliminary work was being carried out at a small number of research groups
such as Leuven, Dundee, and Toronto (Feng and Hirst 2011; Moens et al. 2007).
Now, there are at least twenty research groups across the US and the EU, in which
work on the problem has begun in earnest, with three workshops, including one at
the major computational linguistics conference, ACL, during the summer of 2014.
The rapid expansion is due in equal measure to the increasing maturity of computational
techniques (such as those for argument annotation using supervised learning and topic-
based argument structure recovery using unsupervised learning) and clear commer-
cial demand in areas such as financial market prediction and marketing research.
Though Palau and Moens (2011) offer a good introduction, the field is moving
so quickly that the best reviews of the area are currently offered by the tables of
contents of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 ACL workshops on Argument Mining (see
argmining2016.arg.tech).
9 Case Study
Pease et al. (2017) show how AI techniques for understanding abstract argumentation
and its connections to structured argumentation, linguistic expression of reason-
ing and dialogical practice can work together in a complete cycle, from real-world
argument to philosophical account, formal theory, abstract argumentation and argu-
mentation semantics, and back to application to real-world argument. Extending
earlier work (Pease et al. 2014), we describe each stage in the cycle both formally
and our implementation of it, employing a range of argument tools described above.
Firstly, we take an existing philosophical account of ways in which mathematical
theories evolve via interactions between mathematicians who might have differ-
ing motivations, background theories, concept definitions and so on—specifically,
Lakatos’s account (Lakatos 1976), which is based on real world historical case stud-
ies (1 and 2 in Fig. 8). We then express this account as a formal dialogue system with
sets of locution, structural, commitment and termination rules (3, 4, 8), and express
this in a domain specific language for dialogue game specifications (5). This can
be executed using DGEP and we define operational semantics in terms of updates
to argumentation structures expressed in a linguistically oriented ontology for argu-
mentation, AIF (6). Using TOAST, DungOMatic, and AIFdb, abstract argumentation
frameworks are then automatically induced from AIF via the structured argumen-
tation system ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2014), showing the consequences of
AIF updates at the abstract layer and demonstrating how those abstract semantics
yield a grounded extension that provably always corresponds to the theory that has
been collaboratively created by the dialogue participants (7)—that is to say, the
rules of the dialogical game defined by Lakatos correspond precisely to the rules
of argumentation-based reasoning defined by Dung and others. Bringing the stages
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Fig. 8 The stages involved in the cycle from real-world argument to Lakatos’s account of mathematical
argument, to our model and implementation and application to further real-world argument
full-circle, we show how the model accounts for real mathematical dialogues online
(8). Closing the circle in this way, starting and ending with real-world mathematical
discourse, allows us not only to demonstrate the depth of Lakatos’s original insight,
but also to show that the formal characterisation here remains both honest to the
original and of practical utility to mathematicians. By making this connection back
to the community of argumentation practice, the door is opened to mixed-initiative,
collaborative mathematics.
This is the first time that formally specified and fully implemented argumenta-
tion tools right through the abstraction hierarchy from linguistic expressions through
structured argumentation to instantiated abstract argumentation have been brought
together and applied to a specific, demanding domain of human reasoning. The
foundation that has been laid here allows new explorations into mixed-initiative, col-
laborative reasoning between human and software participants in interactions which
are both naturalistic but formally constrained and well-defined, with the potential to
impact both the pedagogy and the professional practice of mathematics.
10 Concluding Remarks
The key challenge facing the Argument Web now is one of evaluation. Evaluation
of these component parts of the Argument Web cannot simply be expressed as a
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series of psychological experiments or usability studies. Each component has var-
ious facets each of which can be explored separately. The evaluation of argument
representation, for example, can be conducted with respect to theoretical adequacy
(does it handle specific philosophical concepts in a way that remains consistent with
theoretical results and predictions?); inter-annotator agreement (do analysts agree on
how to analyse specific examples when trained to a particular skill level?); computa-
tional expressivity (does it allow for representation of sufficiently common complex
examples?). Similarly, computation of values given argument structures might pro-
ceed with respect to intuition (that is to say, do automatic computational processes
deliver the same results as humans, and are artificially computed results consistent
with psychological experimentation?); mathematical models (do computational pro-
cesses deliver the same results as those modelled mathematically in systems such
as Dung’s abstract argumentation?); epistemological definitions (do computational
processes deliver results that are plausible on epistemological grounds, or that fit
epistemological theory?). And so on. This evaluative programme represents a major
undertaking for the community and one that will spur on the development of both the
Argument Web in particular and the field of computational argumentation in general.
As things stand, the Argument Web comprises a broad set of tools, datasets, infras-
tructure, working policies, interfaces, standards and research programmes that is
not only facilitating the coherence and maturity of research in computational mod-
els of argument, and the availability of data for training AI algorithms in argument
mining, but also serving as a proving ground and perhaps also an inspirational play-
ground for the development and testing of philosophical theories of argumentation.
The Argument Web is thus not only a product of the fruitful interaction between AI
and the philosophy of argument to date, but also stands to facilitate the growth of that
interdisciplinary connection in the future.
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